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EXPANDING THE RULE OF LAW: JUDICIAL 
REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 
LINN HAMMERGREN* 
Well, because I’ve been painted as the “glass-half-empty person,” I’m 
not going to disappoint you. There are two things I want to say before I get 
started. First, although I am now with the World Bank and doing a lot of 
research, I have been working on judicial reform for eighteen years, the 
first twelve of which were spent in the field doing projects with the U.S. 
Agency for International Development (USAID). Second, when I talk 
about the reformers or about “us” in this presentation, I am not talking 
about the Bank, or even necessarily about the donors. Rather, I am talking 
about a group of people who have been actively involved in promoting 
and studying the reforms over the past twenty years. I am going to focus 
on the past twenty years because I think there is a particular judicial 
reform movement in Latin America that started in the early 1980s as a 
result of the redemocratization of most of the region. Actually, some 
countries (Costa Rica) did not have a dictatorship during that period, but 
just two or three countries were included in that category. It was a time 
when donors, and particularly the U.S. government, came in and gave this 
redemocratization a jump-start, although local demand was very important 
in shaping what was done. In some countries, like Brazil, Mexico, 
Argentina, and Chile, local demand really was responsible for most of 
what happened; external donors were much less important there. 
There are three main messages I want to convey here. First, over the 
past twenty years, reform formulas (or reform recommendations) have 
been implemented, to a large extent, in countries throughout the region. 
There are variations—one can argue about detail, one can even argue 
about whether the people who were implementing them really understood 
the purpose underneath the formula, but a lot has changed. 
Second, although this is where the glass-half-empty, glass-half-full 
notion comes in, the change—which has been structural and procedural to 
a large extent—has not necessarily brought the improvements in 
performance or output that were promised. Although I agree that it takes 
time to change things, I think there also is an additional problem: perhaps 
the kinds of recommendations we have made have not allowed us to focus 
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on some of the more fundamental things that require change, and they are, 
in turn, creating some of their own problems. At this point, those of us 
who have been promoting these reforms must ask whether the result 
toward which these countries are headed is really where they want to be. 
There may be some tendencies we are promoting that are not well-
considered. 
The third message is that it is time for a change in direction. I think at 
this point, letting a hundred flowers bloom was great, but now we must do 
a little pruning and be more strategic. I think what was done in the past 
was good, but it is time for a change in direction. 
As far as what has been done, we can probably trace this reform 
movement back to the early 1980s, first as a reaction to democratization. 
We often talk about a “judicial reform program,” but actually several 
different objectives and several different kinds of programs are being 
pursued. One of the objectives was reform to criminal justice, which was a 
very popular demand. Second, were reforms to make courts more efficient. 
Third, were reforms directed at creating greater judicial independence and 
a higher quality judiciary. A series of reforms looked at expanding access, 
particularly to traditionally marginalized populations. And finally, a series 
of reforms looked at strengthening the court’s political role as part of a 
system of checks and balances. This latter set of reforms is probably the 
only one where the donors have not been particularly active, because it has 
been seen from the start as terribly political, and therefore not something 
we wanted to get involved in. However, the countries themselves have 
taken on the task of strengthening the court’s political role. The combined 
efforts in these areas over the past twenty years have produced substantial 
changes. 
I will go through a list of areas, rather than examples. First, 
definitively, there are higher budget levels and salaries, especially for the 
judiciary, but also for other organizations in the justice sector. There has 
been a consequent expansion in the organizations’ national coverage and 
changes in their internal structure. I like to talk about the sector and not 
just the courts, but anyone who compares the courts today with twenty 
years ago would find a completely different universe in terms of substance 
and organization, and this has been a tremendous change. Changes in the 
legal framework have brought procedural and substantive law in line with 
contemporary needs and values. Organizational management systems have 
been strengthened, especially as a means for tracking work flow, budgets, 
and employees. In the past, one could walk into a Supreme Court and ask 
its president, who usually was the head of the judicial government, how 
many judges the system has and how many cases it sees, and he would 
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have no idea. Now, they at least know how many judges they have. Cases 
are another issue, and that is where the statistical systems could be 
improved. There has been an expansion in the information made available 
to the public, both about their own cases and about general operations. 
People now have a somewhat better idea of what their courts are doing, 
particularly with their own case. 
Entire new organizations have been created: public defense, 
prosecution, human rights ombudsmen, anti-corruption offices, 
constitutional courts, and chambers, also judicial councils, as a new form 
of judicial government. Alternative services aimed at expanding access for 
the poor in particular have also been created, such as ADR, legal 
assistance, legal information, small claims courts, multiple services, and 
justice vendors. There has been more attention in general to court 
performance by the media, the public, and politicians. The content of the 
docket has changed, so what the courts decide is now considered more 
important and holds more interest. 
There has been a growth in cases, both in expansion of the types of 
cases and number of clients using the courts, and there has been increased 
involvement by courts in protecting constitutional rights and deciding on 
the constitutionality or legality of executive policies. 
In short, after twenty years of reform, the region’s justice sectors—not 
just the courts, but the other institutions as well—are larger, more 
complex, better funded, have more competent staff, and are increasingly 
equipped with modern information equipment. They also handle more 
work, distributed differently among and within sector organizations, and 
are more visible to citizens in general. Their member organizations tend to 
enjoy greater independence and higher levels of institutional autonomy. 
All of these changes were goals of the reform movement, and although 
they have not been met as much as some would have liked, even the 
strongest critic has to recognize that all of this has happened. 
However, the reforms were not done just to accomplish these things. 
Judges and lawyers, and also the public—particularly ministries of finance 
and NGOs—got behind the reform movement because they wanted to see 
an impact on the quality of services the court provided to them. There was 
also a series of arguments that came out of the donor organizations in 
particular, about how this would create economic growth, reduce poverty, 
and improve governance. I am not sure where I want to fall on those as the 
ultimate justifications, but at least there were improvements in service. 
Here we find the disturbing trends summed up in an article published a 
year ago that compiled all of the public opinion surveys done in Latin 
America over the last six years, asking how the courts compare with other 
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institutions in terms of trust in officers and perceived corruption. With the 
exception of Uruguay and Costa Rica, no country got as high as forty 
percent, and some countries were down in the single digits. And what was 
of even more concern was, over that six year period several of them had 
dropped. We admittedly do not have figures for the entire twenty years, 
and I hope that, if we had been able to compare the answers to those 
questions from twenty years ago with today, we would have seen an 
improvement before this recent backslide. This is a problem nonetheless. 
As the president of the Supreme Federal Tribunal in Brazil said two 
months ago, our answer to this, as judges, has usually been that judges do 
not get high scores in public opinion polls because the public just does not 
understand. This is the usual answer throughout the region. But, he said, 
“no, we have to take this seriously, something is wrong, and we need to do 
something about it.” So there is recognition, even among the judiciary, 
that some of this is not working. Either we have plateaued or we are going 
downward, but it is not a good situation. 
There are new problems that seem to be emerging, perhaps as a result 
of this very reform recipe. One problem is the cost for maintaining sector 
operations. Latin American judiciaries, across the board, tend to get a 
bigger percentage of the public budget than judiciaries anywhere else in 
the world. Costa Rica’s court was an early trend setter; it gets six percent 
(but has to share). El Salvador’s court gets six percent of the budget for 
itself and the judicial council. In Brazil, there is an ongoing debate as to 
how much the courts get, but some courts get up to seven percent of the 
state’s budget, which is an incredible amount. It would be wonderful if 
they were delivering that much more in services, but they are not. The 
problem is that demand is still growing; judiciaries are constantly saying 
that they need more. There is a problem in terms of costs and benefits. 
There is also the issue of accountability for judicial resources and 
actions. As courts become more independent, they should also become 
more transparent and accountable, yet there is a lot of resistance to this. 
For example, Mexican courts will not publish judgments because they 
believe it is an issue between the judge and the party. How can the court’s 
role in upholding the law and the legal framework work if no one except 
the party knows what they are deciding? 
There have been clashes within the sector and between its member 
organizations and other branches of government, including charges of 
judicial interference with policy-making. I know that is universal, but what 
courts get to decide in Latin America is amazing. At one point in Costa 
Rica, the judges thought they would have to overrule the Central Bank’s 
setting of the exchange rate, as an unconstitutional intrusion into the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/8
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Assembly’s monopoly on law making.  The Court changed its mind, but 
only after much reflection on the consequences.  There have been 
problems of what has been called “institutional corporativism,” self-
interested rulings, and lobbying. The Argentine Supreme Court decided 
the constitutional prohibition on reducing judicial salaries meant they 
should not pay the income tax. So, to this day, Argentine judges do not 
pay income taxes, and this has not made them very popular. Ironically, one 
of the members who was just appointed to the court and who opposes the 
exemption, also admitted he did not pay social security taxes (he said that 
was because he did not want a pension). 
There is also the question of “guild reforms,” a term introduced by a 
Latin American colleague of mine, which is very appropriate. This refers 
to the complaint that these reforms have largely benefited the judges and 
the attorneys, but have not necessarily benefited the public. As a result, 
there has been a continuing failure to match the supply of services with the 
demand. That is to say, the courts in Latin America have been falling 
further and further behind in terms of ability to keep up with the cases they 
are getting. 
Additionally, there are some contradictions among objectives. Some 
courts have decided that they need to start charging user fees in order to 
finance their budgets, but obviously that limits access. On the other hand, 
increases in access augment delays. 
I will run through a list of contestable assumptions I presented to the 
Bank, as a means of re-examining our longer term strategy, an exercise we 
are still debating. The suggestion here is that the capacity-building we did 
in the past was necessary. Unfortunately, building capacity to produce 
better services does not guarantee provision of better services. Continued 
improvement requires that we, the reformers, focus more on ensuring that 
funding—whether from the national government, a donor agency, or a 
loan—is linked to concrete, visible improvements in performance. This 
means, among other things, we need to know what the problems are first.  
One of the real problems with the judicial statistics systems in Latin 
America is that one cannot tell from looking at them whether there is a 
problem or not. They inconveniently do not measure delays or indicate 
their impact, as it is unclear what is being decided. This makes it very hard 
to set benchmarks. At the very least, judiciaries must begin to measure 
performance in a way meaningful to users, and then to set benchmarks to 
justify receipt of more money. Then, having decided what the problems 
are, the most credible and direct means must be used to resolve them. We 
should stop worrying about building a beautiful system and then hoping 
justice will come, and start looking at where the system is ugliest and fix it 
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there. That may mean cutting down on some experiments, but it will mean 
that justice will be achieved more quickly. But, on the other hand, maybe 
letting the hundreds of flowers bloom is the best way. Maybe we ought to 
keep planting for awhile. 
Let me just talk about a couple of original and revised assumptions 
based on what we have learned over the past twenty years about judicial 
performance. First, there is the assumption that Latin American courts are 
overloaded with work. You will find no end of proposals for reform, but 
when we actually look at case loads, we find out that most trial courts do 
not receive unmanageable numbers of filings. Some of the case loads are 
surprisingly low; in some countries at least half the judges get only two or 
three hundred filings a year, and these are not complex cases. Because the 
average case in Latin America, as it is elsewhere, is usually debt collection 
or some simple family dispute, not extensive litigation. 
Another assumption is that delays are excessive. In many courts, delays 
before judgment are often not excessive. Where they occur they are caused 
by two things that no one has really been looking at. First, there are 
procedural problems: excess opportunities to file interlocutory pleadings 
and an excess of opportunities to appeal. In Brazil, there are twenty-five 
different ways to appeal, and a good lawyer with a well-heeled client will 
use every one of them. Second, judges are reluctant to use even the powers 
that they have to prevent some of the most outrageous dilatory practices. 
There has been a notion, particularly among the donors but also among 
the judges, that the best indicators of court efficiency are the speed and 
number of judgments. A number of issues have been raised here. One is 
that Latin American courts may render too many judgments, and that they 
make too little effort to encourage settlements. Also, more attention should 
be paid to enforcement: it does not do much good to get a rapid judgment 
if you cannot enforce it. In Latin America, no one has paid any attention to 
this, although it is the usual source of complaints about delay. It is not that 
enforcement is not a problem everywhere, but it is an unrecognized 
problem in Latin America. Additionally, there has been a reluctance in 
Latin America to use any kind of binding precedent, and so common 
violations of rights, for example by the government, have to be taken to 
court on an individual basis. Often the court responds very rapidly to the 
individual, but there are thousands, or hundreds of thousands, of cases 
where perhaps one lead case might be able to resolve the problem, 
particularly if that case also insisted the person perpetuating the abuse 
desist. Individual appeals that simply make the plaintiff whole but do not 
also award damages impose no sanctions on the violator. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss3/8
p601 Hammergren book pages.doc 10/28/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2005] JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA 607 
 
 
 
 
There are also assumptions that augmenting courts’ processing 
capabilities makes room for new users. But that is often not the case. One 
of the biggest impediments to the poor’s access to the courts, which is 
often not mentioned, is the fact that in most countries individuals need a 
lawyer to get to court, even as a defendant. There is simply no way that 
these countries, where seventy percent of the population may be poor, can 
provide a lawyer to every person needing representation. Brazil’s small 
claims courts ought to be looked at more widely for this reason. 
Unfortunately, the Brazilian Bar Association is currently working to 
eliminate the possibility for an individual to go to small claims court 
without a lawyer. I am told they are likely to be successful in this lobbying 
effort, at least at the federal small claims court.  
Another common claim among the donors is that commercial justice is 
the key to market-enabling environments. We are very interested, at the 
Bank, in the impact of justice on economic growth. But we have failed to 
consider that the biggest impediments to investment are problems with 
criminal and administrative law, rather than the quality of the bankruptcy 
law. 
Another assumption was that judicial poverty impedes improved 
performance. I think there are few courts in Latin America where you can 
talk about real poverty anymore. Judicial salaries are often very good in 
these countries, particularly compared to that of your average lawyer or to 
the average per capita income in the country, or even the income of the 
president of the country. 
Additionally, there was the assumption that access to justice is best 
achieved through programs of legal assistance, popular legal education, 
and information services. As I said, one of the barriers to access is the 
requirement that a lawyer represent the case, and this just has not been 
recognized. 
We had also assumed that law and justice problems are best resolved 
by improving court performance. One of the big problems with our 
“judicial reform” effort is that this really is not about reforming the 
judiciary; it’s about reforming the system for resolving disputes. To 
reform the system, better processes are needed for investigating and 
prosecuting criminal cases, protecting rights, and guarding against 
government abuses. Focusing on individual organizations alone is 
insufficient. There is an enormous need to consider each of these pieces as 
parts of a whole. The emphasis on the court has often meant that the courts 
get all the money, even if they are not the ones who need it. I remember 
arguing and pleading with the head of the public defenders in El Salvador 
to request more money, but he said, “the Vice President of the court is 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p601 Hammergren book pages.doc 10/28/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
608 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:601 
 
 
 
 
sitting on the committee, and I can’t ask for more money unless he agrees 
and he may not because he also wants funding.” The one with the 
squeakiest wheel gets the oil. 
In addition, it is conceivable that even improving court performance in 
many of these countries might involve working with other agencies. Two 
of the biggest impediments to enforcing judgments are (1) very poor 
property registries—in order to enforce judgments you need to locate 
assets, and in many of these countries they are not sufficiently documented 
and (2) the procedural rule that to enforce a judgment the creditor needs to 
find assets. There are several European countries where the debtor is 
required to present assets or face sanctions, and Latin America needs to 
consider this system. 
Finally, we assumed that capacity-building will lead to performance 
improvement, but this is not necessarily so. I think that this is where the 
reforms of the next decade are going to have to focus—on defining what 
society wants improved and helping the courts and other institutions to 
carry out these reforms. I do not foresee an executive agency 
implementing the reform, but there may be executive pressure. 
I will end by saying I know at least three ministers of finance in Latin 
American countries have begun to question the money spent on the courts 
and have requested an audit of judicial finances. This would consequently 
allow us to know whether we can justify giving them any more budget. So, 
the day for the courts is coming; it is actually in their own best interests in 
these countries to start asking how they can improve performance, and not, 
as a group of  judges once said to me, how to use the reforms to shorten 
their work day. Thank you. 
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